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NoTEs
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-INVITEES AND LICENSEES
IN KENTUCKY
The purpose of this note is to explore that part of Kentucky torts
law dealing with the liability of owners or occupiers of land for injuries sustained by others while visiting upon the premises. The approach of the Kentucky Court of Appeals to this problem has been to
exact from the landholder a duty of care commensurate with the
status of the visitor. In accordance with this approach, the Court has
erected four status categories,' those of trespasser, licensee, invitee,
and insured, and has prescribed duties of care on a corresponding
scale. The Court has not been too clear either in distinguishing between licensees and invitees or in stating the resultant duties of care.
Since it appears that the greatest volume of litigation is concerned
with the distinction between licensees and invitees and that the uncertainty is most pronounced in these cases, the scope of this note is
confined to the invitee-licensee problem. This note will attempt to
synthesize the decisions in this area and to state the present law insofar as the cases permit.
I
Duties of Care
A. Toward the Licensee
The language used by the Court in describing the duty owed to
the licensee is often misleading. Words are repeatedly used to the
effect that the landholder owes a licensee no duty whatever except to
refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring him. 2 Taken literally, this
language would force the conclusion that a licensee is in a luckless
position indeed. Any right of action would have to be based upon an
intentional act or upon the highest degree of negligence. The cases
indicate that many appeals have been based upon such an assumption.3
1 Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 325, 329, 164 S.W.
2d 537, 539 (1942).
2 Scuddy Coal Co. v. Couch, 274 S.W. 2d 388, 390 (Ky. 1954); Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Stratton, 306 Ky. 753, 755-56, 209 S.W. 2d 318, 319 (1948);
A. L. Dodd Trucking Service v. Ramey, 302 Ky. 116, 119, 194 S.W. 2d 84, 85
(1946); Brauner v. Leutz, 293 Ky. 406, 410, 169 S.W. 2d 4, 6 (1943); Dennis'
Adm'r v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 258 Ky. 106, 112, 79 S.W. 2d 877,
380 (1935).

3 The incidence of wide general statements has been extremely high in the
cases dealing with the duty of care owing to a licensee. This seems to be due to
the practice of verbatim repetition of statements from case to case. Although it is
true that the lawyer should read the Court's decisions with strict reference to the
facts of each case, it would be a substantial contribution to clarity and would no
doubt reduce the volume of appealed cases if the statements made in the opinions
were themselves more closely related to the facts.
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However, the cases, when examined with reference to their facts, put
the licensee in a much improved position.
In actuality, the Court has made duty vary according to the manner
in which the injury is caused. If the proximate cause of the injury is
the defective condition of the premises then the care required is rather
low; 4 if the cause is active negligence, however, the position of the
licensee is improved. 5
In the case of injuries resulting from defects in the premises the
law is unclear until related to specific facts. A few inept phrases,
neither accurate nor complete, are to be found in case after case. It
is often said that a licensee "takes the premises as he finds them;"O
again it has been said many times that the possessor of land owes a
licensee no duty "except to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring
him."7 Remarks such as these have been made in cases where the
issues were actually very narrow and such sweeping statements were
not warranted.8
A licensee does not really "take the premises as he finds them,"
nor does the landholders liability begin with "wanton" or "wilful injury. Whenever the specific question has arisen it has been held that
the licensee is entitled to be told of any dangerous defects which are
actually known to the possessor and unknown to the licensee, unless
such defects are so obvious as to make a warning unnecessary.9 In the
absence of a warning, the landholder has a duty of reasonable care to
make timely repairs.
Also, if defective conditions have developed due to the landholder's
gross negligence he is held accountable even where he has no actual
knowledge of the defect.' 0 Gross negligence is something less than
4 Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 325, 164 S.W. 2d 537

(1942); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Page, 203 Ky. 755, 263 S.W. 20 (1924); Bales
v. Louisville &N. R. Co., 179 Ky. 207, 200 S.W. 471 (1918). For an interesting

discussion of the variance in duty see Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S.W.
319 (1914); and cases cited note 2 supra.
5 See note 4 supra.
6Wall v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 209 Ky. 258, 272 S.W. 730 (1925), and
cases cited note 4 supra.
7
8 See note 2 supra.
In all the cases cited in note 2 supra, the injuries were caused by defective
conditions in the premises; the holdings actually were concerned with passive
negligence in failure to repair. Any language concerning positive acts of negligence had to be, and later is seen to be, dictum.
9 Ockerman v. Faulkner's Garage, 261 S.W. 2d 296 (Ky. 1953) (In this case,
the Court modified this duty to the extent that communication need not be made
unless the landholder should reasonably anticipate that the defective condition
will cause injury.); Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 825,
164 S.W. 2d 537 (1942); Sage's Adm'r v. Creech Coal Co., 194 Ky. 415, 240
S.W. 42 (1922); Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S.W. S.W. 319 (1914);
Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co. v. Leonard, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2046, 79 S.W. 281
(1904).
10 Scuddy Coal Co. v. Couch, 274 S.W. 2d 388 (Ky. 1954).
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wantonness or wilfullness. The Court has defined wanton negligence
as a degree of carelessness so high as to evince a complete disregard
for human life and safety;" gross negligence, however, is the absence
of slight care,' 2 or the absence of such care as a man of reasonable
prudence but careless habits would ordinarily use.13 Compared to
"complete disregard for human life and safety," the conduct of a man
of careless habits seems mild.
The case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Snow's Admr'r,14 decided in
1930, could have led to further inroads upon the landholder's position,
but has seemingly failed to do so. In that case, a railroad company
had built a trestle, providing in addition to its track a driveway for
motor vehicles and a walkway for pedestrians. The public used the
bridge for many years and continued to do so after the company
abandoned the bridge and built a new one. While building the new
bridge, workmen stripped out part of the floor and parts of the guardrails on the old bridge, later replacing everything except a section of
one guardrail. Plaintiff fell due to the absence of the guardrail while
walking across the bridge. The Court held that the railroad owed a
duty of reasonable care to continue to maintain the bridge in safe repair or give adequate notice of its contrary intent. The theory stated
was that one who dedicates property to public use assumes a duty of
reasonable care regarding its condition, although the same result
would presumably have been reached on the theory of known defects.
The case did not make clear whether the plaintiff was held to be a
licensee entitled to ordinary care or an invitee, making its import
dubious. However, this case was later closely restricted to its facts'
and has received no mention in recent years.
The conclusion may be drawn that insofar as defects in the condition of land are concerned, the landholder owes to a licensee a duty
to use some care (such as would be used by a reasonable man of careless habits) to keep the premises safe; he must use reasonable care to
repair defects actually known to him and not to the licensee, or must
warn the licensee thereof, unless the defect is obvious. There is
authority to the effect that one who dedicates property to the public
11 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. George, 279 Ky. 24, 129 S.W. 2d 986 (1939).
12 Ibid.; W. T. Sistrunk Co. v. Meisenheimer, 205 Ky. 254, 265 S.W. 467

1924); Burton Const. Co. v. Metcalfe, 162 Ky. 366, 172 S.W. 698 (1915).
19Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Beard, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1118, 77 S.W. 189
S1903); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Stewart, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 637, 63 S.W. 596
1901); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 397
1883).
14235 Ky. 211, 30 S.W. 2d 885 (1930).
IsBaird v. Goldberg, 283 Ky. 558, 142 S.W. 2d 120 (1940); Moody v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 2.39 Ky. 541, 39 S.W. 2d 988 (1931).
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use, retaining the management and control of the premises, assumes a
duty of reasonable care to keep it in repair.
Concerning injuries resulting from activities on the part of the
possessor, as distinguished from defects in the premises, the licensee
and the invitee seem to stand in the same position. The owner or
occupier of land is under a duty to anticipate the presence of the
licensee upon his premises and is required to use reasonable care to
avoid injury to him through such acts.16 The Court uses the terms
"active negligence" and "positive negligence" to describe this concept.17
B.

Toward the Invitee
The landholder's duty of care toward an invitee is the duty of
reasonable care generally required in negligence cases; that is, the
possessor must exercise such care as would be used by an ordinary
reasonable man in the community under the same or similar circumstances.' 8 Proximate cause has no bearing, as in the licensee cases,
upon the duty.
The "area of invitation" cases make it possible for an invitee to
suddenly lose the protection of the reasonable care rule in certain
instances. The area of invitation may be defined as that part of the
premises which the invitee is invited to use. These cases hold that
when the invitee departs from the area of invitation he is stripped of
invitee status and remains a mere licensee while out of such area. 19
The question is objective and is decided by reference to the standard
of reasonableness; the area is that area which a reasonable invitee
would consider as open for his use.20 Thus it has been held that the
sales floor of a variety store is within the area of invitation while steps
leading down 21to a basement and set off by a small folding gate are outside the area.
C. Conclusion as to Duties
The duty owing to a licensee upon land of another is in reality
much the same as the duty owing to an invitee. Generally, the law
16 Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 325, 164 S.W. 2d
537 (1942); Dennis' Admr v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 258 Ky. 106,
79 S.W. 2d 377 (1935); Black Mountain Corp. v. Webb, 228 Ky. 281, 14 S.W.
2d 1063 (1929); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Page, 203 Ky. 755, 263 S.W. 20 (1924);
Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S.W. 319 (1914).
17Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 325, 164 S.W. 2d

537 (1942).

18 Taylor v. Koenig, 242 S.W. 2d 625 (Ky. 1951).
19 City of Madisonville v. Poole, 249 S.W. 2d 133 (Ky. 1952); Wall v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 209 Ky. 258, 272 S.W. 730 (1925); Ferguson & Palmer Co. v.
Fergson's Adm'r, 114 S.W. 297 (Ky. 1908).
City of Madisonville v. Poole, 249 S.W. 2d 133 (Ky. 1952).
21 Wall v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 209 Ky. 258, 272 S.W. 730 (1925).
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seems to be that the landholder owes to both the licensee and invitee
a duty of reasonable care to prevent injury; however, in the case of
defects in the premises, if such defects are actually unknown to the
landholder, the duty owing to a licensee is not so high as that owing
to an invitee. In this latter case the duty to make and keep the
premises safe is one of slight care or such care as a reasonably prudent
man of careless habits would use if the visitor is a licensee; the duty
of reasonable, as distinguished from slight, care is owed to an invitee.
More concisely, it may be said that a landholder owes to both
licensees and invitees a duty of reasonable care to avoid causing them
injury, except that in the case of injuries resulting from unknown
defective conditions in the premises the duty owing to a licensee is
lesser, being one of slight care.
In the writer's opinion, the above statement is accurate and comprehensive. Since it has been found that broad statements tending to
mitigate the duty owing to a licensee are really applicable in only one
type of case, it is thought to be more realistic to state first that duties
owing to licensees and invitees are generally the same and then to
describe the defective conditions situation as an exception.
II
Licensee-Invitee Distinction
The Court of Appeals has said that the distinction between licensees
and invitees is "often shadowy and indistinct."22 The fact situations
covered by the cases leave a twilight area in which conjecture is the
only guide. 23 Other than this area wherein no cases have reached the
Court, confusion results from frequent failure to identify the plaintiff
in a case as a licensee or invitee; the Court has sometimes talked of
the duty owing to "such licensee or invitee." In addition to these
factors, the most recent case upon the subject is very difficult to
reconcile with the stated rule. This latter case is considered so
unusual and radically different from its predecessors that it will be
considered alone following a discussion of prior cases.
A.

The Mutual Benefit Test
The various American jurisdictions are not in accord on the question of the difference between licensees and invitees. 24 W. L. Prosser
22
Shoffner
2

v. Pilkerton, 292 Ky. 407, 166 S.W. 2d 870 (1943).
3Strangely, the Court of Appeals has not yet had occasion to determine the
status of a non-customer injured on business property, where a general invitation
extends to the public. A large volume of litigation would be expected in this
area; it may be that the minor damages resulting from falls and bumps in stores
largely
2 4 preclude costly appeals.
Prosser, Torts, 458 (2d Ed., 1955).
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and the Restatement of Torts disagree as to what theory finds support
in the majority of jurisdictions. 25 The basic problem seems to be
whether invitee status should be predicated upon invitation alone or
upon benefit, or the reasonable expectation thereof, to the landholder.
Prosser maintains that a sufficient basis of liability is to be found in
the implied assurance of reasonable care which accompanies an invitation; the Restatement of Torts adopts the test of economic benefit.
commonly called the "mutual benefit test."2 Regardless of which
theory is the majority view, Kentucky seems to subscribe to the test of
mutual benefit.
The case of Southern Ry. in Ky. v. Goddard,27 decided in 1905,
seems to be the first case in which the Court of Appeals clearly
enunciated a rule of distinction between licensees and invitees. The
injured party in that case was a person shipping horses on defendant's
railway. He fell and was injured while moving about a railroad car
after dark, seeing to the loading of his horses. The Court held the
shipper to be an invitee, saying:
The distinction between invitation and license is stated in Wharton on
Negligence (book 1, sec. 849), as follows: "The principle appears to
be that invitation is inferred where there is a common interest or
mutual advantage, while license is inferred where the object is the
mere pleasure or benefit of the person using it."28

The Kentucky cases since the Goddard case have consistently affirmed the mutual benefit rule. Although a recent commentator has
said that the Kentucky cases are inconsistent and that case authority
is to be found supporting the view that invitee status may arise from
an invitation alone, 29 such authority exists, if at all, only in the form
of dictum.

30

25
Id. at 456; Restatement, Torts secs. 382, 843, Comment a (1934).
26
Prosser, Torts, 456 (2d Ed., 1955).
27 121 Ky. 567, 89 S.W. 675 (1905).
28
Id. at 574, 89 S.W. at 676.
29
Note, 43 Ky. L. J. 328, 330 (1954-55).
3
0 The two cases relied upon to support that view do not so hold. The first
of these was Leonard v. Enterprise Realty Co., 187 Ky. 578, 219 S.W. 1066
(1920). In this case, the plaintiff, a prospective tenant, visited rental property
owned by the defendant on the invitation and with the consent of the defendant
for the purpose of renting the property if suitable. There was no indication in
this case, even in the form of dictum, that an invitation would suffice of itself to
make an invitee of the visitor. On the contrary, the Court specifically restated
the mutual benefit test and held the plaintiff to be an invitee on that basis. Id. at
581, 219 S.W. at 1067-68. Even so, the Court dismissed the question of status
as irrelevant, holding that no negligence was shown. Clearly this was a case in
which the plaintiff's visit involved mutual benefit to the parties.
The other case, that of Young's Adm'r v. Farmers and Depositors Bank, 267
Ky. 845, 103 S.W. 2d 667 (1937), squarely upholds the mutual benefit test. In
that case, plaintiff was an employee of a plumber who was employed to remove
water containing an explosive substance from the basement of defendants build-
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The fact situations available for study in the reported cases indicate
only one instance in which the mutual benefit test may break down.
The instance occurs where the property in question has been dedicated
by its owner to the public use and where the owner retains the management and control of the property. This was the situation in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Snow's Adm'r,a3 previously discussed in relation
to the duty of care owing to a licensee. In that case a railroad company was held to a reasonable duty of care in maintaining a bridge
containing a walkway and driveway for public use as well as railroad
tracks. It could have been that the plaintiff was held to be a licensee
entitled to a high duty of care; equally, the Court could have awarded
him invitee status and applied the reasonable duty of care as to defective premises as usual. Since either construction seems supportable,
the case is mentioned in both sections of this note.
B.

The Scuddy Case
The recent case of Scuddy Coal Co. v. Couch 2 came before the
Court of Appeals twice. The plaintiff was riding a mule across defendant's mining property on his way to town. His home and several
others were located in the hills behind the mine and he and his
neighbors customarily crossed defendant's property in going to the
highway. On the occasion in question plaintiff approached the narrowgauge railroad track running from defendant's mine-opening to its coal
chute. As cars of coal were then coming out of the mine on the track,
defendant's foreman stopped plaintiff and told him to wait until the
cars had passed before crossing. When the cars were past, the foreman told defendant to proceed across the track at a certain place,
pointing to the place. In crossing, plaintiff's mule stepped on a defective tie which caused the mule to throw plaintiff, injuring him.
When the case was first appealed from the judgment for plaintiff,
the Court reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that plaintiff
could be no more than a licensee and that he took "the premises as he
ing. He was injured when the substance exploded. On the question of plaintiff's
status, the Court said, "although not directly employed by the owner of the
premises, one who enters on them by virtue of his employment to do work which
his employer has contracted to do has the status of an invitee." Id. at 848, 103
S.W. 2d at 669. Here, of course, the Court was explaining plaintiff's relationship
to defendant in terms of benefit. Going on to the question of duty, the Court
said that, "rhe duty owing by an owner or person in possession to those who
come on the premises by invitation . . .is . . .to use ordinary care to have the
premises in a reasonably safe condition." The word "invitation" here is a legal
conclusion based upon the fact of employment. Also, as in the Leonard case, the
status question was held irrelevant, a peremptory instruction for defendant being
upheld for lack of negligence as matter of law.
312435 Ky 211 30 S.W. 2d 885 (1930).
32 Scuddy Coa Co. v. Couch, 274 S.W. 2d 388 (Ky. 1954); Scuddy Mining
Co. v. Couch, 295 S.W. 553 (Ky. 1956).
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found them." Upon the new trial plaintiff again secured a verdict and
the case was again appealed. Strangely, the Court distinguished its
previous opinion and held the plaintiff an invitee.
In explaining the seeming conflict between the two opinions, the
Court relied upon one fact which appeared in the second record and
not in the first. This fact was that defendant's foreman directed plaintoff to cross the track at a certain point; in the first record no more was
shown than that the foreman delayed the plaintiff until the cars had
passed, presumably then leaving him to cross wherever he pleased.
The exact import, in terms of holding, of the Scuddy case is difficult
to ascertain. The Court did not elucidate its reason for placing emphasis on this single fact and did not state any general rule involving the
fact. The entire question was resolved in a few lines, and the point
was not abstractly discussed at all.
One thing, though, is very clear. There was no element of mutual
benefit involved in the case; the mutual benefit rule was definitely not
applied and had it been applied there can be no doubt that the result
would have been different. It is possible that the Court construed the
foreman's acts in directing the plaintiff to cross at a particular place
as conduct amounting to invitation and raised invitee status upon
this basis. If this is true, then the case represents a departure from
the benefit test and becomes highly important in view of the fact that
the benefit test has been firmly entrenched in Kentucky for at least
fifty years, since the Goddard case. As previously seen, the inviteelicensee distinction appears to be significant only in cases involving
unknown defective conditions in the premises; perhaps the Court now
intends to eliminate the distinction entirely. If this is the case, the
lack of discussion or statement of a general rule in the Scuddy case is
understandable; the indication is that the Court has decided to proceed
upon this new tack with caution, and without unequivocally committing itself, a common judicial policy.
III

The Alternative Viewpoints
The desirability of a new test of distinction, one which allows
invitee status to be based upon the implied assurance implicit in an
invitation, is a moot point. A great deal has been written on the question and it appears that modem writers for the most part favor the
33
invitation test.

38 For

a discussion of the problem with references to other writers, see Prosser

Torts 453-58 (2d ed. 1955). Especially see nn. 91-2 for a rather slanted historical
explanation.

NoTEs
The rationale of the mutual benefit test is that of quid pro quo.
The thought is that any reasonable man would exercise a higher degree
of care toward one coming upon his premises to give benefit than
toward one coming for a purpose of no benefit to the landholder.
Under this theory the licensee is put upon a footing substantially equal
to that of the landholder himself, and the landholder is not required to
exercise a higher degree of care for the licensee's safety than he
exercises for his own safety. Of course, this principle will not make
the landholder's position impregnable. He will be liable for ordinary
negligence except in relation to defective conditions, which ordinarily
would be in existence before the coming of the licensee and result
from passive, not active, conduct. The difference between active and
passive conduct may not seem logical, but the Court seems to feel that
active conduct is more culpable. In the case of persons invited on the
premises for a purpose of the landholder, the higher duty applied
must stem from the view, commonly held in our society, that he who
pays his way may demand and receive special consideration. The concept of consideration as giving rise to special right-duty relationships
is not unusual in business law, and here it is found in torts. Whether
such a basis of liability is proper seems a question which can be
answered only by reference to the prevailing sense of values in a jurisdiction.
A more altruistic viewpoint inheres in the theory that a basis of
liability should be found in the implied assurance which is a part of
most invitations. Proponents of this view seek to hold the invitor to
his promise whether consideration exists or not. This is reminiscent
of the moral obligation controversy in contracts law and raises the
question of how far the courts will go in requiring exemplary conduct
on the part of persons who are actually not supermen but everyday
humans. The extent to which one is entitled to rely upon a voluntary
representation must be determined in reference to common knowledge
of human nature. Again, reference to the prevailing sense of values is
indicated. A factor of flexibility in the law, allowing for such reference,
would be welcome.
Probably neither test is fully adequate. In jurisdictions where the
mutual benefit test is applied, courts have strained the concept of
benefit upon occasion, as in the cases of accidents to non-customers
in business establishments, where the element of benefit has been
found in the possibility of future business resulting from good will.34
On the other hand, it is difficult to justify invitee status in the case of
34 Gilliland v. Bondurant, 332 Mo. 881, 59 S.W. 2d 679 (1933); but see,
Stewart v. Texas Co., 67 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
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a farmer who invites a stranger to hunt upon his land; it would require
a considerable stretch of imagination to say that the farmer undertook
to assure the hunter of the safety of the premises. The type of invitation construed into the facts of the Scuddy case furnishes another
doubtful instance; this type of invitation, if such it may be called, is
more in the nature of a resigned acceptance of a bothersome visitor
than an active solicitation and constitutes a poor basis for implying an
assurance of safety.
IV
Conclusion
The invitee-licensee distinction is a mechanism designed to select
automatically the proper duty of care owing in a given instance. This
necessarily involves a wholesale imputing of stereotyped motives to
different individuals in many different types of fact situations without
provision for varying concepts of fairness in different communities.
The cases demonstrate that no matter what test is adopted for use
in making the distinction, instances frequently occur to which the results obtained from strict application of the rule are unsatisfactory.
Factors which may reasonably bear upon the question of duty include
benefit, assurances of safety, reasonable inferences on the part of the
visitor, and standards of fair play prevalent in the particular community. These factors will inevitably vary in given fact situations and
in given communities.
The law of torts as to negligence generally predicates liability upon
failure to observe the standard of reasonable care in one's conduct.
Where the present system classifies the visitor and applies the resulting
duty of care, it would seem preferable merely to present to the factfinder in each case the question of what duty a reasonable man would
exercise under the circumstances. Thus the distinction between licensees and invitees with its resulting complications and shaded fact
area would be dispensed with, and the "shadowy and indistinct" line
of delineation would be no more. To hold every man to a standard
of reasonable conduct under the circumstances of his particular case
would be a far simpler endeavor.
Jesse S. Hogg

